





















This paper aims to contribute to the understanding of individuals’ fairness perceptions by using 
cross-section data from the British Social Attitudes Survey to estimate what seem to be the first 
fairness perceptions-of-pay equations in the literature. The results suggest that, consistent with 
the existence of discrimination in the labour market, non-white workers perceive their pay as 
disadvantageously unfair. In contrast, a rather interesting finding is that women’s fairness-of-
pay perceptions are higher than that of men. The findings suggest that tackling pay alone will 
not eliminate feelings of underpayment. There is also evidence that with age, workers feel less 
fairly paid. 
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Fairness has mainly been used in economics in an objective sense to describe an 
outcome. As a subjective evaluation, its role in generating outcomes has only recently been 
acknowledged though its value in informing individual behaviour has long been advanced in 
the other social sciences. Certainly, as a social being, an individual’s behaviour may be affected 
by societal factors of which fairness perceptions are a part
1.  
The implication that fairness considerations are an ever-present feature of economic 
exchanges, operating alongside the maximisation of pecuniary gains, is substantiated by results 
from social psychology experiments, ultimatum games, and reciprocity experiments (see 
Andrews (1967), Rabin (1993), Fehr et al (1997) and Clark and Sefton (2001)  inter alia). The 
main tenet of these results is aptly summarised by Adams (1965) who states ‘men do not simply 
become dissatisfied with conditions they perceive to be unjust. They usually do something 
about them’
2.  
With compelling evidence that fairness is a valued good, it is possible to make sense 
of the many market ‘anomalies’ that are not adequately accounted for by the standard model
3 
such as the rejection of positive offers in ultimatum games, voluntary contribution to public 
goods and involuntary unemployment (see for example Isaacs et al (1985), Dawes and Thaler 
(1988), Akerlof and Yellen (1990), and Fehr et al (1993), Fehr and Gächter (2000)). So, given 
the possible prevalence of fairness considerations and insofar as agents act on their 
perceptions, fairness as a behavioural motive may not be an epiphenomenon as traditional 
economists contend.  
                                                   
1 Some neurological studies (see for example LeDoux (1996)) argue that emotions are sometimes a better 
guide to action than are rational thought processes. 
2 Adams, J.S (1965), ‘Inequity in Social Exchange’ in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, L. 
Berkowitz (ed.), Vol. 2, New York: Academic Press. Pg. 276 
 
3 The standard model here refers to the model in which the modus operandi of the individual is that of selfish 
maximisation of pecuniary gains.  
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Of the studies that have examined the effects of fairness considerations on 
individual behaviour, none have investigated the determinants of the fairness perceptions of non-
hypothetical individuals
4. For that reason, it is not possible  to understand or to tell why 
individuals hold the perceptions they do. Hence, the evidence in the British Social Attitudes 
(BSA) survey which show that 36.89 percent of the sampled employees perceive their pay as 
unfairly low and 7.71 percent perceive their pay as unfairly high, an outcome that violates the 
fundamental welfare theorems and deviates from standard theoretical predictions
5, cannot be 
accounted for by the existing literature. Consequently, if economists are to properly predict or 
explain economic behaviour there is a need to understand what influences fairness perceptions. 
In this respect, this paper attempts to make a contribution to the study of the role of fairness in 
economics.  
The focus of this paper is workers fairness perceptions of their pay. The objective is 
that by explaining the determinants of perceptions of fairness vis-à-vis pay, the way will be 
paved towards a better understanding of the effects of fairness perceptions on individuals’ 
labour market behaviour. Important in the contribution of this work is the use of attitudinal 
data, which is sourced from the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA). This data set facilitates 
the first ever known estimation of fairness perception equations. The perceptions of women 
and ethnic minorities are considered against the backdrop of discrimination in the labour 
market. Similarly, the relationship between fairness perceptions and age and fairness perception 
and comparison wage are looked at in relation to the negative correlation suggested in both 
cases by theory and evidence.  
                                                   
4 Alves and Rossi (1978) and Shepelak and Alwin (1986) both studied how the characteristics of computer 
generated households entered in respondents’ judgement of how fair they perceive the income of these 
households to be. 
5 Assuming as is done in the social psychology literature that individuals prefer a fair outcome to an unfair 
one, it is possible to make both an individual who feels his pay is too low and one who thinks his pay is too 
high, better off. By redistributing some of the rewards of the individual who perceive his pay as too high to 
the other who thinks it to be too low a Pareto improvement can be achieved.   
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At this juncture, it is necessary to stress that fairness perceptions of pay are likely to 
be different from the expression of satisfaction of pay, for it is possible that an individual is 
(completely) satisfied with his pay but yet think it to be unfair (as could be the case of someone 
who thinks his pay is more than he deserves). Also, by no stretch of the imagination, an 
individual can be unsatisfied with his pay but yet claim that it is a fair reward for the work 
rendered (as could be the case with someone who believes his pay reflects the work done but 
who nonetheless wishes to do better in terms of income). 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the concept of 
fairness perception employed and reviews what the literature has to say about the role of 
fairness considerations in economic outcomes. The hypotheses to be tested are developed in 
section 3 and the empirical analysis is taken up in section 4. Section 5 concludes.    
 
2. Pointers from Economic Theory 
2.1 Understanding Fairness perceptions 
 
According to the theory of fairness postulated by social psychologists, most notably 
Homans (1961) and Adams (1965), the individual compares his reward-to-investment ratio to 
that of some relevant other. If the individual perceives his reward-to-investment ratio to be 
smaller than that of the comparison other, he will feel relatively deprived. If he believes it to be 
otherwise, he will feel relatively advantaged
6. Individuals however, can reduce or eliminate the 
cognitive dissonance by altering their investments
7 or their perceptions of their investments 
(for evidence and discussions see Adams and Rosenbaum (1962), Adams (1962), Adams 
(1965), Andrews (1967), Pritchard et al (1972), Austin and Walster (1974)).  
                                                   
6 Adams (1963) states ‘if two individuals receive the same pay, but are unequally qualified, then both parties 
may suffer cognitive dissonance, even the man who is relatively overpaid’. However, how the individual feels 
about the dissonance is not per se germane to the definition of fairness. What matters is simply the presence 
of (unjustified) inequality. 
7 The altering of inputs indicates that fairness is characterised by acts of reciprocation.  
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However, a longstanding and unresolved issue is that of the identity of the 
comparison other. In some cases the ‘other’ can be easily identified as in exchanges involving 
two actors. Empirical evidence may also help pinpoint the relevant ‘other’. For instance, 
Willman (1982) cites evidence that suggest manual workers compare themselves with other 
manual workers when evaluating the fairness of their pay-effort bargain. On the other hand, 
Graham and Pettinato (2002) present evidence that individuals may compare themselves to 
others who are in a higher social or income bracket. In other cases, it is quite unclear with 
whom comparison takes place. For example, in determining the fairness of pay, does the 
individual compare himself with his peers or those  in a different position? Is comparison 
restricted to those within the firm or does it extend to others working in a different firm, 
different industry,  et cetera? Does the worker evaluate the fairness of his pay in light of the 
profitability of the firm or is it instead a combination of many of these possible ‘others’?
8  
Furthermore, where the fairness judgement is that of neutral agents as in the studies 
of Kahneman  et al (1986a, 1986b) and Charness and Levine (forthcoming), in which 
respondents are asked to evaluate the fairness of certain policies of the firm, it is not apparent 
that any ‘other’ is involved. Yet, individuals do make fairness judgements. The following 
example from Kahneman et al (1986a) may help illustrate this. 
 
A hardware store has been selling snow shovels for $15. The morning after a 
large snowstorm, the store raises the price to $20. Please rate this action as: 
Completely fair    Acceptable 
Unfair       Very unfair 
 
It was found that 82 percent of the respondents rated the actions of the firm as 
unfair. Nevertheless, it is not obvious whom or what respondents use as the reference other in 
                                                   
8 See Merton (1967), Parducci (1995), and Ordóñez et al (2000) for an in-depth discussion on the nature of 
comparison groups.  
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forming this judgement. It may be argued that the respondents use a hypothetical comparison 
other but there is no self-evident reason that necessitates this. From the above example, it is 
quite plausible that the respondents simply believed that such an unfortunate incident does not 
justify a hike in price. 
From the forgone, it can be summarised that an individual’s fairness judgement is 
not likely to be based solely on a direct comparison of reward-to -investment ratios. His innate 
characteristics and his values and beliefs may also along with this ratio, play an important role. 
It is this testable conceptualisation of fairness perceptions that occupies this paper. 
 
2.2 The importance of fairness concerns – Theory and Evidence 
Probably the most illustrative examples of the role of fairness concerns in individual 
behaviour are that of ultimatum games. The basic bargaining game involves two players one 
who is entrusted the task of dividing a good between himself and the other player, say player 2. 
Player 2 must decide whether to accept the proposed division or to reject it, in which case both 
players receive nothing. According to standard competitive theory of income maximisation, 
player 1 will give player 2 the smallest possible division of the good and player 2 will accept 
since a positive amount is better than none at all. However, many observed outcomes refute 
this prediction.  
Several experiments in Kahneman  et al (1986b) revealed that in such bargaining 
games, a large number of individuals are willing to award generous amounts. In the 
experiments, this behaviour was observed even when there was complete anonymity and no 
possibility of retaliation. Results showed that the majority of the allocators divided $20 evenly 
and that receivers rejected positive amounts they perceived to be unfair even though the refusal 
meant a lost both to themselves and to the allocator. Similarly, receivers were prepared to 
reward fair behaviour with most willing to give up money to punish (reward) an unfair (fair) 
allocator and nearly all preferred to share a sum of money with those who had a reputation of  
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being fair as opposed to being unfair. This inclination of individuals to punish those reputed to 
be unfair and even so in cases where they are not themselves victims of the unfair outcome, is 
supported by results in Kahneman et al (1986a) and Thaler (1985). Other experimental evidence 
show that neither the complexity of the pay off system (see Güth et al (1982)) nor an increase in 
the stakes (see Hoffman et al (1996)) eliminated players desire to offer egalitarian divisions
9. 
As one would imagine, it is not only individuals that are guided by fairness 
considerations. There is also evidence which suggests that in constructing wage policies, firms 
take into account workers’ concern for fairness (see Blinder and Choi (1990), Campbell and 
Kamlani (1997) and Fehr  et al (1998)). For instance, Campbell and Kamlani (1997) found that 
on average over 69 percent of employers think cutting wages would reduce effort primarily 
because workers would then perceive their wages as unfair. Interestingly, less than 5 percent 
thought effort would fall because of a reduction in the cost of shirking. 
This  seemingly prevalent belief of employers is further supported by the arguments 
in Akerlof and Yellen (1990) and later evidenced in Fehr  et al (1993), that if workers do not 
receive what they perceive as a fair wage they will reduce their effort levels, and if they believe 
they are fairly treated, they will provide effort greater than or equal to the minimum.
10 This 
implies that fairness considerations can have consequences for the level of productivity in the 
economy. 
This is somewhat echoed Rotemberg (1996) who claims that changes in individuals’ 
perceptions of the fairness of their wage can be crucial for the distribution of income in a 
country. This is based on the argument that the equilibrium distribution of income is less 
unequal when employees believe t hey are unfairly paid than when they perceive otherwise 
                                                   
9 Such results are used to counter the claims that simple experiments and small amounts such as $20 are 
inadequate in soliciting typical economic behaviour of individuals 
10 The experimental studies of Adams and Rosenbaum (1962), Adams (1963), Andrews (1967), Pritchard et al 
(1972), and Austin and Walster (1974), found that given no other means of eliminating cognitive dissonance, 
when workers perceive their pay to be unfair, whether advantaged or disadvantaged, they respond by 
changing their effort levels. However, as discussed in Lawler (1968), there is contention over whether those 
benefiting from unfairness are motivated at all to reduce the cognitive dissonance.  
 
8 
insofar as they are likely to quit to realise the true value of their productivity elsewhere. In 
support of this conjecture, he cites evidence that the distribution of income is found to be 
more equal in countries where people perceive large income inequality to exist. 
Therefore, based on the surveyed literature, it can be surmised that individuals treat 
fairness as a normal good for which they are willing to pay a ‘price’. They act on fairness 
conside rations and these actions at times diverge from that predicted by the standard model 
and could have wide-ranging economic consequences. Accordingly, concern for fairness should 
be part of the economists’ toolbox when undertaking the task of explaining econ omic 
behaviour and so, it is then of paramount importance to know what influences fairness 
perceptions. The following hypotheses are drawn up to help illustrate how fairness-of-pay 
perceptions are shaped. 
 
3. Hypotheses 
Several hypotheses about the fairness-of-pay perception of workers can be inferred 
from labour market theories and evidence and a few are put forward to test whether 
perceptions are in line with what these theories and evidence suggests.  
 
3.1 Race and Gender Discrimination  
Discrimination, which is characteristically unfair, occurs when two workers who 
have observationally equal productivity-related characteristics are paid differently. It is a well-
documented fact that ethnic minorities and women face persistent discrimination in the labour 
market (see for instance Chiswick (1973), Wright and Ermisch (1991), and Neumark (1998))
11. 
Their earnings are normally lower than that of their white and male counterparts respectively. 
For example, using data from the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality for employers in the 
                                                   
11 Reasons for the persistence of wage differentials between men and women and black and whites have been 
extensively investigated by  Goldberg (1982), Blau and Kahn (1992), Hellerstein et al (1997), Neumark (1998), 
inter alia.  
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USA, Neumark (1998) finds a 10 to 14 percent mean hourly wage differential between men and 
women and a 19 percent difference between whites and blacks. Between whites and Hispanics, 
the difference was found to be 4 to 8 percent.  
Becker (1971) argues that this discrimination should be unsustainable in the long 
run. He proposes that if firms discriminate against a particular group of workers, then in a 
competitive market, non -discriminatory firms will attract all the labour of this unfavoured 
group. The prejudiced firms would consequently face higher costs and in a bid to maximise 
profits, would be forced to cease discriminatory practices.  
Presumably, the realisation of Becker’s prediction that discrimination will be 
eliminated in the long run relies partly on the victims’ recognition that they are unfairly treated 
and their subsequent pursuit to eliminate the unfairness. If individuals do not perceive their 
situation to be unjust, they will do nothing to alter what others see as unfair. It is only by 
recognising and redressing the inequity that more equal pay can be achieved (Rotemberg 
(1996))
12. Moreover, if ethnic minorities and women do not believe their pay to be unfair, 
welfare and efficiency loses may not be as great as thought. Given that discrimination against 
non-whites and women exists in the labour market (see Chiswick (1973), Goldberg (1982), 
Wright and Ermisch (1991), and Neumark (1998) inter alia) and supposing that they are aware 
of this discrimination, they will be more inclined to have a downward bias in the fairness 
evaluation of their pay.  Based on this, the following hypotheses arise: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Comparing fairness perceptions, female workers will perceive their pay to be less fair than male 
workers. Moreover, the fairness-of-pay perceptions of non-white female (white female) workers are comparatively 
lower than that of non-white male (white male) workers. 
 
                                                   
12Thus, the persistence of discrimination could be the result of individuals not perceiving their pay as unfair 
and hence failing to act against it.  
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Hypothesis 2:  Comparing fairness perceptions, non-white workers will perceive their pay to be more unfair 
than whites workers. Moreover, the fairness-of-pay perceptions of non-white male (non-white female) workers are 
comparatively lower than that of white male (white female) workers. 
 
3.2 Age 
There is evidence that older workers face some discrimination in the labour market. 
However, this is not likely to be related to earnings (Johnson and Neumark (1996)). In fact, 
older workers appear to be better off where earnings are concerned even taking into account 
that wage growth is quadratic with age (Lazear (1979)). It i s normal for employers to start 
employees on wages below the value of their marginal product and subsequently increase the 
wage with tenure as a means of enticing them to remain with the firm. Hence, it is usual that 
younger workers are paid less than their marginal product while older workers receive wages in 
excess of their marginal product and reservation wage. This is supported by the empirical 
findings of Hanoch and Honig (1985) and Neumark and Stock (1999). Aware of this, it is 
probable that relative to older workers, younger workers are more likely to undervalue their 
pay. 
In addition, according to the arguments of the social psychologists Austin and 
Walster (1974), age inures individuals to unfairness. They declare that ‘… we should not be 
surprised  that older people become less aroused and less angry when they encounter 
inequitable treatment than do younger people who are psychologically unprepared for unjust 
experiences’. From this, it is further deduced that older ethnic minority workers should have 
higher fairness-of-pay perceptions than their younger counterparts. Taking the above into 




Hypothesis 3 :  Comparing fairness perceptions, younger workers will have a greater tendency than older 
workers to view themselves as unfairly paid. Moreover, younger workers from ethnic minorities are more likely to 
perceive their pay as unfair when their perceptions are compared to that of their older counterparts. 
 
 3.4 Wage Comparison 
Ceteris Paribus, fairness perceptions of pay are more favourable as wage rises but 
decreases as the comparison wage increases
13. Thus, the coefficients on the own wage variable 
and the comparison wage variable should be equal with opposite signs. This leads to:  
 
Hypothesis 4a: Fairness perceptions are negatively related to the comparison wage.  
 
Hypothesis 4b:  If relative wage matters for fairness-of-pay perceptions, the coefficients on the wage and 
comparison wage variables are of equal magnitude but opposite signs.  
 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
 
Many economists are wary of subjective data. To them, subjective responses are not 
always representative of actual actions or outcomes. They argue that what an agent thinks does 
not necessarily translate into reality and what he proposes to do is not what he necessarily does. 
Undoubtedly, there is merit to this way of thinking
14 but these economists would be hard-
pressed in convincing other social scientists who draw largely on such data to study human 
motivation and behaviour, that subjective data are void of information or are not reliable 
sources for understanding economic and social outcomes.  
Given the bias against using subjective data in economics, it is of no surprise that its 
use in empirical economic analysis is still quite novel. This and the lack of much availability of 
                                                   
13 See section 2. 
14  The statistical analysis by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) seeks to provide concrete reasons why 
economists are justified in their mistrust of subjective data.  
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subjective data sets probably accounts for the relatively few research papers on the economics 
of individual perceptions. Of those that have looked at issues of fairness perceptions, most 
have relied on experimental data
15.  It is however important to complement the conclusions 
from experimental data with that from non-experimental data. 
 Experimental data are normally small-scaled and are often fraught with the 
problems of effectively simulating a ‘real world’ environment and capturing or controlling for 
the many influences on agents’ decision-making
16. Moreover, being able to manipulate the 
thoughts of individuals to assume the intended role is extremely difficult and success can never 
be truly ascertained. Non -experimental data on the other hand avoid these problems associated 
with experimental data and are far more likely to successfully capture the behavioural 
characteristics of ‘real’ economic actors. In addition, they contain a wealth of information on 
various characteristics of the respondents something that does not commonly feature in data 
from experimental studies
17. As such, non -experimental data are desirable for the study of 
fairness perceptions.    
Notwithstanding, among those studies that have used non-experimental data, the 
importance of the role of the characteristics of an individual in shaping his fairness perceptions 
has not been adequately investigated. Addressing this deficiency, the aim of this analysis is to 
study the role of the demographic characteristics of employees and of the comparison wage in 
their fairness perceptions of pay and to discover how, if at all, these differ from what would 
ordinarily be expected given established theory and evidence. To this end, use will be made of 
the British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey data set, which because of the nature of the fairness 
question therein, is itself, a salient feature of this study.    
 
                                                   
15 Experimental data here includes data obtained from responses to hypothetical questions. 
16 As Manski (2000) notes, interactions observed in artificially constructed environments might, in general, 




4.1 The Data and Sample 
  4.1.1 Variable description 
 
The BSA Survey is carried out each year and is dedicated to the measure of 
attitudinal variables. The survey covers most major topics of modern empirical interest 
including the economy and labour market participation and a majority of the questions are 
repeated each year thus making it possible to pool the data. Unfortunately, given the lack of 
continuity across years for some of the variables of interest
18, the number of years pooled 
together is rather small. These are the years 1996 to 2000. Added to this, the survey conducted 
in 1997 is a scaled-down version as a result of the simultaneously c onducted British Election 
Study and consequently, the number of observations is considerably smaller than that of the 
other three years. Nonetheless, the pooled sample should provide a reasonable number of 
observations to carry out a meaningful analysis
19.  
Data is used only for those individuals aged 18 to 65, living in Scotland, England or 
Wales and who are employees at the time of the interview. Non-responses were dropped and 
so too were ‘don’t know’ responses. The final pooled sample contains 5486 employees of 
which 23.44 percent are in 1996, 8.35 percent in 1997, 22.62 percent in 1998, 21.16 percent in 
1999, and 24.43 percent in 2000. 
The principal advantage of the BSA data set for this investigation is that it contains a 
specific question that captures  employee fairness perception of pay. This sort of question, 
which addresses a real rather than a hypothetical experience of an employee
20, is not known to 
                                                                                                                                                 
17 Nonetheless, experimental data does have advantages over non-experimental data. Most notably, it allows 
the experimenter to limit the many idiosyncrasies that cannot be easily controlled for in non-experimental 
data. Notwithstanding, experimental and non-experimental data should generally be regarded as congruent.  
18 The problem is most acute for industry and sector classification. 
19 More information about the survey can be found at the UK Data Archive web site. 
20 This is unlike Alves and Rossi (1978) and Shepelak and Alwin (1986) who looked at the fairness perceptions 
of the income of hypothetical households.  
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be available in any other major data set for the United Kingdom. The survey question reads as 
follows: 
How would you describe the wages or salary you are paid for the job you do 
– on the low side, reasonable, or on the high side? If low: very low or a bit 
low?   
 
Though the question does not explicitly use the term fair(ness)
21, it is taken for 
granted here that individuals are not likely to regard their wage as both unfair and reasonable or 
on the low/high side but fair. Hence, the responses are assumed respectively to be identical to 
very unfairly low, a bit unfairly low, fair, and unfairly high, which are  correspondingly equal to 
less than fair, fair, and more than fair. It is this question that describes the dependent variable, 
fairness-of-pay perception
22. Its distribution is as follows:  
        1. very unfairly low    11.41% 
        2. a bit unfairly low    25.48% 
        3. fair        55.40% 
        4. unfairly high     7.71% 
 
In arriving at an answer to the above question, (it is ordinarily thought that) 
employees compare their pay to that of a chosen comparison other. There are no variables in 
the BSA data that describe the wage of possible comparison others and hence a measure must 
be constructed. Indeed, the problem of identifying and quantifying reference group behaviour 
is a perennial one that retards empirical investigation of the social and psychological aspects of 
                                                   
21 Indeed, according to the Oxford English Reference Dictionary (1996), one of the synonyms for the word 
reasonable is the word fair and certainly, it is unlikely if not impossible to come up with a convincing example 
to show that an individual can claim his pay to be unfair but yet reasonable or that it is fair but nevertheless 
unreasonable.  
22 It is believed that this question inspires individuals to evaluate whether or not they are correctly 
remunerated given the perceived value of their investments. Hence, responses are assumed to adequately 
reflect workers fairness perceptions of their pay.  
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economic behaviour and regrettably, theory does not provide any definitive guide to who the 
comparison other is. Consequently, reference groups are usually arbitrarily chosen. However, it 
is commonly argued that individuals compare themselves with others who, to varying degrees, 
possess like characteristics (see for instance, McBride (2001) and Clark (2001)). In line with 
this, some studies, like that of Clark and Oswald (1996), use the fitted values from a Mincer-
type wage equation to proxy the comparison wage
23. Another approach employed by Clark and 
Oswald (1996) and McBride (2001), is the calculation and assignment of the average wage by 
particular characteristics. In the case of Clark and Oswald (1996), each individual is assigned an 
average wage based on their gender and weekly hours. McBride (2001) assigned each individual 
an average wage by age. This latter approach is adopted here. 
The choice of characteristics on which the comparison wage is calculated is 
influenced by the evidence in Willman (1982), which suggests that workers compare themselves 
with those in a similar occupation and by the work of McBride (2001) who finds evidence that 
individuals compare themselves with others within their age group. It is therefore assumed that 
workers compare themselves to others with the same occupation and age characteristics and 
hence, the comparison wage is calculated as the log average hourly wage by occupation and age 
for each of the years
24. This creates 175 comparison -wage data points. To increase the precision 
of the estimates, the comparison wage is constructed using the much larger Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) data set for the years 1996-2000
25. 
Descriptive statistics of all the variables used in the analysis can be found in Table 
1.1. The demographic composition of the sample is reasonably representative of the population 
                                                   
23 Akerlof  et al (1988) employs the same method to derive an alternative wage measure to study the quit 
decision of employees. 
24 This is equivalent to a mean regression of log hourly wage on occupation, age and year. Indeed, jobs are 
normally posted stating occupation and in most cases age requirements. Thus, it is plausible that individuals 
form comparisons of their pay based on this widely available information. 
25 The years 1996-2000 were used so as to match with the years of the BSA sampled period. Moreover, it is 
not novel to construct such a measure form a data set separate from the principal one. For different reasons, 
both the studies by Clark and Oswald (1996) and McBride (2001), construct the comparison wage from data 
independent from the central data set.  
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of the United Kingdom. Over 50 percent of the sampled employees are females, only 5 percent 
are non-whites, and the average age is 39 years.  
 
4.1.2 Cross Tabulations – A cursory glance at the data 
Simple cross tabulations indicate that the proportion of employees holding any 
fairness-of-pay perception is fairly consistent across years especially 1996 to 1998 (Table 1.3a). 
This stability is notable since it exists for different cross-sections of workers and it suggests that 
the sample data is representative of the perceptions of the population and that fairness-of-pay 
perceptions may be a marked feature in employees’ work decisions. Moreover, despite the 
small number sampled in 1997, the figures show no striking differences in that year. In each of 
the five years, the median employee perceives his wage to be fair
26 but more than 35 percent 
believe they are underpaid. Interestingly, and a puzzle for the standard theory, approximately 8 
out of 100 employees believe their pay to be more than fair.  
Looking across gender and ethnicity, it can be seen from Table 1.3b that female 
workers have a greater likelihood of perceiving their pay as unfairly low when compared to 
their male counterparts and as expected, a greater proportion of non-whites believe that their 
pay is unfairly low. This on a first impression is in accordance with the fact that women and 
ethnic minorities face discrimination in the labour market but more importantly, their 
perceptions suggests that they may be conscious of the discrimination and this in turn affects 
the way they perceive their pay.  
    In Table 1.2c it is noted that workers between the ages of 40 and 49 enjoy on 
average the highest levels of earnings whilst those aged 18-29 earn on average the least. 
However, as is clear from Table 1.3c it is workers between the ages of 30 and 39 that are the 
least likely to perceive their wage as unfairly low. Those aged 40-49 report feeling more unfairly 
paid than even those aged 18-29. Further, although workers 50-59 years of age earn more than  
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60-65 years olds there is no discernable difference between their fairness-of-pay perceptions. 
Thus, overall, there is slight suggestion that fairness perceptions of pay decline with age.  
The tabulatio ns across age also imply that workers perceptions are affected by much 
more than the absolute level of their pay.  Indeed, as seen from a comparison of the data in 
Table 1.2a-c and 1.2a-c, the large differentials that exist in earnings are not replicated i n 
fairness-of-pay perceptions.  
Thus far, a preliminary look at the raw data sans controls show that there is some 
support for hypotheses 1 and 2 but not for hypothesis 3. Both female workers and non-white 
workers appear to have lower fairness-of-pay perceptions relative to male workers and white 
workers respectively. However, with age workers tend to have lower fairness-of-pay 
perceptions. The next section uses econometric methods to analyse the data more formally. 
 
4.2 The Empirical Model and Estimation Strategy 
Fairness-of-pay perceptions are examined in a cross-section fairness regression 
equation for each randomly sampled employee  i at time t . The equation takes the form: 
 
  (1) 
 
 
The variables  GENDER,  RACE ,  AGE,  WAGE, and  COMPARISON WAGE are self-
descriptive. The vector Zit contains auxiliary control variables, which include other personal 
and job characteristics of the employee. These are used mainly as robustness checks on the 
contribution of the demographic, wage, and comparison wage variables to fairness perceptions 
of pay. The error term, eit is assumed to have mean zero and variance s
2.   
                                                                                                                                                 
26 This accords with the argument that most people tend to accept the status quo as fair (Shepelak (1986) and 
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The discrete ordering of the dependent variable means that it is most appropriate to 
use an ordered response model
27. Following what is now a norm in the empirical literature, an 
ordered probit model (as developed by McKelvey and Zavoina (1975)) is employed to estimate 
variants of equation (1). The probability of a response being in the k
th response category of the 
fairness perception variable (f ) is then given by: 
 
 
where the function  F is the standard normal distribution. The restriction 
k 121 0..... mmm - <<<  is imposed to ensure that the probabilities are positive and eit is assumed 
to be independently identically normally distributed with mean zero and 
2 1 s = . Higher orders 
of f represent increasingly favourable fairness-of-pay perceptions from very unfairly underpaid 
to unfairly overpaid.  
Parenthetically, it should be pointed out that what is of interest here is the worker’s 
perception of the relative value of his investments and not whether he is happy or unhappy 
about any cognitive dissonance
28. So, whether or not the worker believes an unfairly high pay is 
bad, is a separate matter from his perception that it is above what he should justifiably receive.  
It is also worth noting that the ordered probit procedure does not assume that 
changes from one fairness perception value to another are equiproportionate. For instance, an 
increase in fairness-of-pay perception from very unfairly underpaid to a bit unfairly underpaid 
is not assumed equal to an increase in fairness-of-pay perception from a bit unfairly underpaid 
to fairly paid or from fairly paid to unfairly overpaid. 
An unfortunate drawback in using cross-section data is that it is difficult to flesh out 
(the direction of) causal effects. Moreover, the nature of the dependent variable creates the 
                                                   
27 A good survey of ordered response models can be found in Amemiya (1981). 
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problem that because of individual differences and unobservable differences in the way in 
which the question may have been asked, different individuals may interpret the question 
differently. Thus, to minimise the uncertainty and to address the problem of endogeneity, 
estimation of equation (1) proceeds in a stepwise fashion. First, a model that includes only the 
purely exogenous characteristics of the worker is estimated. Other variables of interest are then 
added in succession to monitor how the preceding estimates change. The more general models 
are used for further analysis if variable additions do not significantly alter the results. The 
robustness of the findings is then checked by the inclusion of a range of auxiliary variables that 
also reduce the problem of possible omitted variable bias and by other tests that address the 
following econometric issues. 
 
4.3 Econometric Issues 
4.3.1 Measurement error 
As alluded to earlier, the wording of survey items may mean different things to 
different individuals and the ordering of the questions, which may influence  individuals’ 
interpretation of successive questions and hence bias the responses given, may further 
exacerbate the problem. Responses can also be affected by situational factors such as mood 
and environment. However, it can be argued that within the same language, the wording of 
survey items may not pose a problem. Furthermore, in each BSA survey year, recurring 
questions are worded the same and are repeated in the same order. Nonetheless, some on hand 
measures are taken here to allow valid inferences to be  made. To wit, year dummies are 
included to capture differences in the survey across years and a random perturbation is 




4.3.2 Self-selection bias 
As is usually the case for many labour market problems, perceptions of pay are 
recorded only for individuals who are employees. Since individuals choose whether to be 
employed or not, it may be possible that the probability of being an employee is correlated with 
how the individual would perceive his pay. That is, if fairness-of-pay perception is likely to be 
high then the probability of working will be correspondingly high. However, plots of the data 
indicate that the distribution of characteristics is similar for the sample of employees and non-
employees. Moreover, if it is believed that it is individuals who feel that their pay is likely to be 
(or is) unfairly low that will be most prone to choose not to be employees, then based on the 
standard theory of income maximisation, the high p roportion (36.89 percent) of employees 
stating that their pay is unfairly low should not be noticed. Therefore, as is similarly done in the 
related job satisfaction literature and indeed in many other labour market analyses, it is assumed 
initially that being an employee or not is independent of the error term in the fairness equation. 
Given this, Heckman (1990) demonstrates that legitimate conditional inferences can be made. 
This assumption is nonetheless tested as part of the robustness checks. 
 
4.3.4 Earnings 
The data contains information on earnings rather than on wages and hence the 
analysis uses earnings as an approximation for the wage. Given that wages make up the 
majority of earnings for most workers, this seems a reasonable way to proceed. 
To allow comparability with the comparison wage, the earnings variable must be 
recorded in a similar form. Since the true earnings variable is categorical, it is replaced by the 
expected values from an hourly earnings interval regression as proposed by Stewart (1983). The 
earnings model is assumed to have the following latent structure: 
 




where  i w  is the hourly earnings, which falls into one of K intervals with the k
th being given by 
(Ik-1, Ik), which are the lower and upper limits respectively. The vector  i x  is a  1 Jx  vector of 
explanatory variables and  bi  is a  1 Jx  vector of unknown parameters. The errors,  i u  are 
assumed to be independently identically normally distributed with mean zero and variance  s
2
. 
It is further assumed that  i u  is independent of  i x . The conditional distribution of  i w  is given 
by  
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where  g and  G r epresent the density and cumulative distribution of the standard normal 
respectively and  s ¢ =- b ()/ kki ZI x . This method provides consistent estimates unlike the ad 
hoc practice of taking the midpoint of each interval as a measure
29.  
There are further benefits to using the predicted earnings values two of which are 
that, one, the precision of the estimates of the effect of the earnings on fairness perceptions is 
improved since it is now continuous and two, the problem that the recorded earnings variable 
may not be randomly assigned
30 and hence would be correlated with the error terms of the 
fairness perceptions equation is counteracted. 
    The flip side to estimating the earnings variable is the likely endogeneity of tenure in 
the earnings equation. As such, a two-stage least squares (instrumental variable) estimation is 
conducted using housing and year dummy interactions as instruments in the tenure equation. 
These instruments were chosen because it is believed that whilst owning or renting a house will 
                                                   
29 See Stewart (1983) for a discussion and an illustration. 
30 Those with high wages may be the ones with high fairness-of-pay perceptions. 
xx
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affect how long the employee chooses to remain with his employer there is no evident reason 
why this would affect his earnings. The quality of the instruments was checked as 
recommended by Bound et al (1995). They were found to be valid – they were sign ificant in the 
tenure equation but insignificant in the earnings equation. 
    A similar problem arises with earnings as a regressor in the fairness-of-pay 
perception equations. The fairness perception an employee holds regarding his pay is likely to 
influence the type of job he takes up and the level of his productivity and consequently his 
wage. This possible equilibrium relationship between fairness-of-pay perceptions and earnings 
means that to obtained unbiased estimates, earnings should be instrumented. To this end, the 
size of the household is used as an instrument as it is assumed to be correlated with earnings 
insofar as it is likely to influence whether the worker takes up full-time or part-time 
employment
31 but unrelated to fairness perceptions of pay.  This instrument is found to be 
valid in that it appears statistically significant in the earnings equation but insignificant in the 
fairness-of-pay perceptions equations. Due to space, the tenure and earnings equations as well 
as the equations showing the validity of the instruments used are not presented here but are 
available on request. 
To take into account the fact that the earnings equation and the fairness-of-pay 
perception equations contain the fitted values from (respective) supplementary regressions, the 
standard errors in these equations are bootstrapped. 
     
4.4 Main Results 
  Gender 
 
At a glance, the coefficients on the female variable in Table 2 suggest that the more 
similar the environment shared by men and women, the less likely women are to perceive their 
pay as unfair compared to men. Most notable is the finding that, while across industry women  
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appear to have lower fairness-of-pay perception, the reverse seems to hold once they are 
compared to men in like industries. This result implies that women may be concentrated in 
industries where fairness perceptions are generally low, possibly because these are 
characteristically low-wage industries. However, within these industries (as shown in column 5), 
they are on average comparatively more likely to believe that they are fairly paid. The higher 
concentration of women in low-wage industries may be linked with their need to work part-
time possibly because of obligations at home. 
The suggested higher fairness-of-pay perception of women is strengthened by the 
results presented in Table 3. With the inclusion of earnings in the equation (columns 1 – 2), the 
coefficient on the female variable remains positive and is now statistically significant. This 
further lend credence to the supposition that the negative sign on the female variable in 
columns 1 – 4 of Table 2 is driven by the fact that women are mostly employed in low-wage 
industries where fairness-of-pay perception is correspondingly low. Once these factors are 
taken into consideration the fairness-of-pay perception attributable to gender becomes more 
conclusive. This conclusion is unchanged after controlling for the comparison wage.  
Further results presented in Table 4 show that regardless of their ethnicity, women 
seemingly have more favourable fairness perceptions of their pay. It is worth pointing out 
however that not much emphasis can be placed on the findings for the non-white sample 
(column 4) as the results are in general poorly determined, potentially due to the rather 
inadequate sample size. The results therefore lead to a rejection of hypothesis 1. 
The finding that women are more likely than men to perceive their pay as fair is in 
line with the empirical evidence in the job satisfaction literature that women are normally more 
satisfied than  men with the salient characteristics of their job including pay satisfaction (see for 
example Hodson (1989) and Clark (1997)). Nonetheless, it is a surprising result that given the 
                                                                                                                                                 
31 There is evidence that full-time jobs are better paid than part-time jobs. See Ermisch and Wright (1992) for 
evidence as well as a list of literature on the issue.  
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well-established labour market fact that women are subjected to pay discrimination, they are 
more likely than men to believe that they are fairly rewarded for their labour. 
 
Race 
According to the results in Tables 2 and 3, non-white workers in comparison to 
white workers perceive their pay to be more unfair. This result is remarkably consistent and 
highly statistically significant for different specifications of the fairness perception equation
32.  
Looking at the gender sub-samples in Table 4, the relatively lower fairness-of-pay 
perception of non-whites is apparently true for both men and women though for women 
ethnicity appears to matter most
33.  
Based on these findings hypothesis 2 cannot be summarily rejected. Thus, it can be 
concluded that cognizant of discrimination in the market, non -white workers are more likely 
than whites workers to feel unfairly paid. However, what is more interesting is that the findings 
indicate that even after controlling for earnings, non-white workers still have a greater 
probability of viewing their pay as unfair. Thus, it can be argued that if non -white workers were 
to receive wages that are on average greater than that of their white counterparts, they would 
still have a greater tendency to feel underpaid. The air of discrimination that exists in the labour 
market may serve to bias non -white workers’ fairness perception of their pay. Thus, it is this 




A look at Table 2 suggests that hypothesis 3 cannot be rejected. As they grow older, 
workers seem to have increasingly favourable fairness-of-pay perceptions. However, as is 
evident from Table 3 (columns 1 and 2), the positive relationship between age and fairness 
                                                   
32 This is so for both those including and those excluding the wage. Although those including the wage are 
lower in magnitude. Also, this is true even though wage for non-whites are often thought to be higher than 
that of whites in the UK labour market.  
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perceptions is accounted for by the fact that older workers earn on average more than younger 
workers. Moreover, the results are no longer significant. Controlling further for comparison 
wage (column 3), the influence of age on fairness-of-pay perceptions is now significant at the 
10 percent level. Thus, there is weak indication that, as they get older, workers do not become 
inured to unfairness. The results in Table 4 tell a similar story. However, it is only for male 
workers that the result is statistically conclusive
34.  Thus, it is only for male workers that 
hypothesis 3 can be rejected. 
  
Comparison Wage 
Contrary to intuition and somewhat a puzzle, the results in Table 3 to 5 show that 
the comparison wage has a positive and insignificant impact on workers’ fairness-of-pay 
perceptions
35.  Admittedly, this result is perhaps an anomaly and it should not be concluded 
that comparison wage is unimportant in the evaluation of fairness of their pay. It may simply 
be the case that the average individual’s comparison wage is not based on occupation and wage 
(see Graham and Pettinato (2002)) or possibly that measurement error has served to obscure 
the results. 
 
4.5 Robustness checks 
Several checks were done to establish the veracity of the results outlined in the 
previous section. The findings are detailed below but due to space most are not presented. 
First, to ascertain that the building block results presented in Table 2 are not 
affected by the order in which the variables are added, the regressions are run several times, 
                                                                                                                                                 
33 For men the coefficient is not statistically significant while for women it is. 
34 One caveat that should be noted for the result pertaining to hypothesis 3 is that it is difficult to separate out 
the cohort effects.  
35 McBride (2001) also finds that a marginal change in the comparison income based on age will have a 
positive effect on an individual’s well-being. The intuition that may be offered for the positive relationship 
between fairness-of-pay perceptions and the comparison wage is that upwardly mobile individuals 
(predominantly the young) may prefer being surrounded by higher earners as it raises their aspirations.   
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each time varying the order in which variables are added. Reassuringly, the results remained 
essentially the same.  
Secondly, a full set of control variables is included in the main fairness-of-pay 
equation (column 3 of Table 3) to check the general stability of the findings and to address the 
problem of omitted variables bias. The results are shown in Table 5. The female variable 
maintains a positive and statistically significant coefficient and that on the non-white variable 
continues to display a significant negative influence on fairness perceptions of pay. The 
coefficient on the age variable also remains statistically significant. 
The earnings variable has as usual a positive coefficient that is statistically influential 
and which appears, as would be expected, to have the greatest impact on fairness-of-pay 
perceptions. The comparison wage is still statistically insignificant but now exerts a negative 
influence on a worker’s fairness perception of pay. This seems the intuitively correct sign. 
However, this result in some sense highlights the unreliability of the coefficient on  the 
comparison wage measure.   
Using data for the years 1998-2000
36, an additional regression was performed 
controlling for the effort and preference for hours of work. This was done to address the 
possibility that how hard the individual works and his length of exposure to, say an 
environment in which he is relatively deprived, may meaningfully alter the results. For instance, 
it might be argued that the positive sign on the female coefficient is probably due to the 
likelihood that male workers exert greater effort than female workers and to women’s lower 
preference for hours of work, which reduces the experience of an unfavourable environment.  
The results from the regression yielded nothing qualitatively different to the conclusions 
already drawn.  
Thirdly, the possible effects on the estimates of non -random self-selection into the 
sample of employees are investigated.  First, a Heckman full maximum likelihood estimation of  
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the earnings equation is performed. The equation contains all the non-job variables of Table 5. 
The probit model for being employed includes all the variables in the earnings equation plus 
housing ownership and year dummy interactions. These latter variables are assumed to affect 
the probability of being employed but are not believed to help determine the earnings. The 
predicted earnings and the inverse mills ratio (?) are then included in the fairness-of-pay 
perceptions equation  
The inverse mills ratio was found to be statistically significant which indicated that 
an individual’s fairness-of-pay perception probably does indeed affect the decision to work as 
an employee. The negative sign on the coefficient of ? may  prima facie seem counter-intuitive 
but it is actually not unexpected
37. A negative coefficient on ? is frequently found in the 
estimation of wage offer equations (see Wright and Emrisch (1991) and Dolton and Makepeace 
(1986)). This arises because of the high correlation that is likely to exist between the 
observables that raise the reservation wage and those that raise wage offers (see Ermisch and 
Wright (1994) for a statistical analysis). Individuals that are most productive in jobs will tend to 
be more productive in non-labour market activities. Thus, since fairness perceptions of pay are 
tied to wages, the logic follows that as the reservation wage rises, the reservation fairness-of-
pay perception rises also and consequently the individual is more likely to be either self-
employed or unemployed. What is of paramount importance however is that the directions of 
the effects remain robust: In particular, the sign on the female, race, age, and earnings variables 
are unchanged. However, only the race variable remains statistically significant. Nonetheless, 
since this finding suggests that in relation to those who do not work, women wh o work have 
lower fairness-of-pay perceptions, the results are likely to be downward biased thus 
underestimating how much more fairly women regard their pay compared to men.  
Next, random disturbances were introduced in the dependent variable to check the 
sensitivity of the results to the possible existence of measurement error. A set of transition 
                                                                                                                                                 
36 Data for the effort and preference of hours of work variables are only available for the years 1998 to 2000.  
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probabilities was defined and a uniform random number was generated. The categories of the 
dependent variable were then altered based on the values of these probabilities and the random 
numbers. Several regressions were performed for varying distributions of the probabilities. 
Once again, the results were encouraging. The main coefficients of interest, with the exception 
of the age variable in one instance, remained statistically significant and the signs remained 
unchanged. 
Finally, for the specification in Table 5 the dependent variable is regrouped. This is a 
simple test of stability, which is different in nature to the other tests. Given the arguably small 
proportion of observations in category 4, it is combined with category 3. It was found that the 
sign on the comparison wage was still insignificant but had moved from being negative to 
being positive. However, the sign on the rest of the coefficients under examination remained as 
before and with the exception of the race variable, were statistically significant. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper is the first known systematic study of employees’ fairness perceptions of 
pay. Cross-section data for the United Kingdom were used to establish what affects the 
demographic characteristics of workers and their comparison wage have on how fairly they 
perceive themselves to be remunerated. The main results suggest surprisingly that despite 
facing evidential pay discrimination, female workers have higher fairness-of-pay perceptions. 
On the other hand, non-white workers do feel unfairly treated with respect to pay. The 
discriminatory environment that exists against non-white workers may account for the 
downward bias in their perceptions of their pay. Since these results are robust to the inclusion 
of earnings and other characteristic, it is possible that they may be driven by cultural and 
socialisation factors. 
                                                                                                                                                 
37 ? also enters the wage equation negatively.  
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    Unfavourable fairness-of-pay perceptions do not wane with age. Instead, workers 
feel more unfairly paid as they grow older.  Financial pressures of career, children in school, 
and other responsibilities such as aging parents may account for this finding.  
    Surprisingly, there was no robust evidence of relative income effects. The 
comparison wage based on occupation and age did not have a significant impact on fairness 
perceptions of pay and appeared to be positively related to fairness-of-pay perceptions. This 
anomalous finding may simply be highlighting the need for better da ta on comparison income 
measures or a possible econometric specification problem that needs to be resolved in future 
research.  
    With the effect of the comparison wage apart, the main findings are in general 
statistically robust. Furthermore given that fairness perceptions of pay are affected by other 
























Table 1.1: Sample means by gender and race (1996 – 1999) 
(Standard Deviations are in parentheses) 
Variable  Male  Female  Whites  Non-whites  All 
FAIRNESS-OF-PAY PERCEPTION (1 – 4)  1.622  1.568  1.602  1.460  1.594 
  (0.780)  (0.798)  (0.790)  (0.777)  (0.790) 
            FEMALES       0.520  0.491  0.518 
      (0.500)  (0.500)  (0.500) 
            NON-WHITE  0.056  0.050      0.053 
  (0.229)  (0.218)      (0.223) 
            AGE (18 – 65)  38.667  39.246  39.099  36.592  38.967 
  (11.150)  (10.943)  (11.112)  (9.494)  (11.046) 
            MARRIED  0.669  0.625  0.650  0.588  0.646 
  (0.471)  (0.484)  (0.477)  (0.493)  (0.478) 
            CHILDREN  0.391  0.423  0.404  0.484  0.408 
  (0.488)  (0.494)  (0.491)  (0.501)  (0.491) 
            HOUSEHOLD SIZE  2.644  2.553  2.581  2.889  2.597 
  (1.289)  (1.193)  (1.223)  (1.501)  (1.241) 
            HOUSING (1 – 3)  1.296  1.276  1.276  1.457  1.286 
  (0.624)  (0.591)  (0.599)  (0.711)  (0.607) 
            EARNINGS  2.038  1.800  1.914  1.930  1.915 
  (0.527)  (0.516)  (0.534)  (0.540)  (0.535) 
            COMPARISON WAGE  2.076  1.995  2.034  2.039  2.034 
  (0.358)  (0.332)  (0.347)  (0.344)  (0.347) 
            UNION MEMBER  0.373  0.327  0.348  0.370  0.349 
  (0.484)  (0.469)  (0.476)  (0.484)  (0.477) 
            UNION RECOGNITION  0.504  0.517  0.512  0.488  0.510 
  (0.500)  (0.500)  (0.500)  (0.501)  (0.500) 
            SCHOOL  0.740  0.764  0.749  0.824  0.752 
  (0.439)  (0.424)  (0.434)  (0.382)  (0.432) 
            POST-SCHOOL   0.690  0.652  0.669  0.689  0.670 
  (0.463)  (0.476)  (0.471)  (0.464)  (0.470) 
            NON-MANAGERIAL  0.557  0.698  0.628  0.657  0.630 
  (0.497)  (0.459)  (0.483)  (0.475)  (0.483) 
            FULL-TIME  0.968  0.624  0.787  0.837  0.790 
  (0.176)  (0.484)  (0.409)  (0.370)  (0.408) 
            TENURE   104.632  81.865  93.769  76.004  92.833 
  (55.677)  (52.590)  (55.269)  (52.757)  (55.278) 
            FIRM SIZE (1 – 5)   3.319  3.062  3.183  3.239  3.186 
  (1.270)  (1.286)  (1.284)  (1.308)  (1.285) 
            RELATION (1 – 4)  2.967  3.121  3.055  2.895  3.047 
  (0.832)  (0.787)  (0.811)  (0.823)  (0.812) 
            REGION (1 – 11)  6.241  6.337  6.187  8.152  6.291 
  (3.086)  (3.149)  (3.114)  (2.575)  (3.119) 
            OCCUPATION (1 – 7)  3.863  3.934  3.901  3.869  3.900 
  (1.692)  (1.491)  (1.592)  (1.589)  (1.592) 
            SECTOR (1 – 4)  1.460  1.842  1.655  1.720  1.658 
  (0.848)  (1.045)  (0.971)  (1.031)  (0.974) 
            INDUSTRY (1 – 15)  6.982  9.331  8.179  8.564  8.199 
  (3.706)  (3.607)  (3.854)  (3.542)  (3.839) 





Table 1.2a: Earnings by years 
Earnings      Year             
  1996 1997  1998 1999 2000 Total
   
8000 and less  32.97 31.88  33.68 29.03 24.40 30.11
8001 – 18000  42.77 44.54  39.00 41.69 38.81 40.87
18001 – 29000  18.82 18.56  20.95 20.41 23.43 20.74
29001 and over  5.44 5.02  6.37 8.87 13.36 8.28
   
Total  100.00 100.00  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00







Table 1.2b: Earnings by race and gender 
Earnings    White   Non-White    Total   
Male Female Total Male  Female Total Male Female  Total
 
8000 and less  12.18 46.98 30.27 19.73 35.21 27.34 12.60 46.39  30.11
8001 – 18000  45.59 36.36 40.79 44.90 39.44 42.21 45.55 36.51  40.87
18001 – 29000  28.97 12.88 20.66 25.17 21.13 23.18 28.76 13.30  20.74
29001 and over  13.26 3.78 8.33 10.20 4.23 7.27 13.09 3.80  8.28
 
Total  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00  100.00







Table 1.2c: Earnings by age 
Earnings      Age             
  18 - 29 30 - 39 40 - 49  50 - 59 60 - 65  Total
   
8000 and less  33.98 26.60 29.09 31.30 39.44  30.11
8001 – 18000  49.76 39.93 34.95 39.37 42.22  40.87
18001 – 29000  13.37 23.68 25.23 20.07 11.67  20.74
29001 and over  2.90 9.78 10.72 9.27 6.67  8.28
   
Total  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00  100.00











Table 1.3a: Fairness of pay perceptions by year 
Fairness-of-pay perceptions      Year             
  1996  1997 1998 1999 2000  Total
     
Very unfairly low  11.98  11.57 11.36 9.82 12.24  11.41
A bit unfairly low  25.58  24.67 24.58 25.32 26.64  25.48
Fair  55.21  56.55 56.33 56.85 53.06  55.40
Unfairly high  7.23  7.21 7.74 8.01 8.06  7.71
     
Total  100.00  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00  100.00







Table 1.3b: Fairness-of-pay perceptions by race and gender 
Fairness-of-pay 
perceptions    White Non-White    Total 
Male Female Total Male  Female Total  Male Female Total
 
Very unfairly low  10.30 12.11 11.24 13.61 15.49 14.53  10.48 12.28 11.41
A bit unfairly low  24.80 25.84 25.34 28.57 28.57 28.03  25.01 25.92 25.48
Fair  56.37 54.61 55.46 55.78 52.82 54.33  56.34 54.52 55.40
Unfairly high  8.53 7.44 7.97 2.04 4.23 3.11  8.17 7.28 7.71
   
Total  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00  100.00 100.00 100.00







Table 1.3c: Fairness-of-pay perceptions by age 
Fairness of pay perceptions      Age               
  18 - 29 30 - 39 40 - 49 50 - 59 60 - 69 Total 
   
Very unfairly low  12.32 8.92 12.15 13.52 12.78 11.41 
A bit unfairly low  24.56 23.97 25.38 29.01 29.44 25.48 
Fair  54.19 58.12 55.54 52.13 52.78 55.40 
Unfairly high  8.94 8.98 6.93 5.34 5.00 7.71 
   
Total  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 









Table 2: Fairness-of-pay perception for the UK (1996–2000) 
Basic specification 
(Pooled ordered probit regression results) 
Dependent Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
FEMALE   -0.060**  -0.061**  -0.045  -0.027  0.056 
  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.037)  (0.038)  (0.040) 
            NON-WHITE  -0.250***  -0.291***  -0.278***  -0.276***  -0.264*** 
  (0.068)  (0.072)  (0.073)  (0.074)  (0.073) 
            AGE  0.036***  0.037***  0.024***  0.026***  0.021** 
  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
            AGE SQUARED/100  -0.050***  -0.051***  -0.035***  -0.037***  -0.031*** 
  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
            1997  0.049  0.051  0.052  0.046  0.052 
  (0.065)  (0.064)  (0.066)  (0.066)  (0.067) 
            1998  0.071  0.073  0.080*  0.077  0.087* 
  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.048)  (0.048) 
            1999  0.109***  0.111***  0.123***  0.119***  0.117*** 
  (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.048) 
            2000  0.027  0.030  0.035  0.034  0.050 
  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.046)  (0.047)  (0.047) 
            Regional dummies (1 – 11)  -  v  v  v  v 
Occupation dummies (1 – 7)  -  -  v  v  v 
Sector dummies (1 – 4)  -  -  -  v  v 
Industry dummies (1 – 15)  -  -  -  -  v 
            µ0  0.612***  0.604***  1.141***  1.124***  0.815*** 
  (0.206)  (0.210)  (0.230)  (0.231)  (0.276) 
            µ1  0.874***  0.875***  0.893***  0.893***  0.905*** 
  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.023) 
            µ2  2.654***  2.657***  2.710*  2.714***  2.751*** 
  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.036) 
           
Number of observations  5486  5486  5486  5486  5486 
Pseudo R 2  0.004  0.005  0.020  0.021  0.030 
Log Likelihood  -6119.251  -6114.034  -6024.850  -6018.107  -5958.060 
Note:   ‘Robust’ standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 




















Table 3: Fairness-of-pay perception for the UK (1996–2000) 
Earnings and comparison wage controls  
(Pooled ordered probit regression results) 
Dependent Variable  (1)  (2)  (3) 
FEMALE   0.191***  0.257***  0.260*** 
  (0.039)  (0.041)  (0.041) 
        NON-WHITE  -0.212 ***  -0.211 ***  -0.213 *** 
  (0.071)  (0.072)  (0.072) 
        AGE  -0.017  -0.018  -0.026 * 
  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.016) 
        AGE SQUARED/100  0.011  0.013  0.022 
  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.018) 
        EARNINGS  0.874***  0.854***  0.854*** 
  (0.048)  (0.050)  (0.050) 
        COMPARISON WAGE      0.230 
      (0.253) 
        1997  0.028  0.036  0.034 
  (0.066)  (0.066)  (0.066) 
        1998  0.064  0.068  0.055 
  (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.049) 
        1999  0.034  0.037  0.014 
  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.052) 
        2000  -0.076  -0.063  -0.095 
  (0.047)  (0.048)  (0.058) 
        Regional dummies (1 – 11)  v  v  v 
Occupation dummies (1 – 7)  v  v  v 
Sector dummies (1 – 4)  v  v  v 
Industry dummies (1 – 15)  -  v  v 
        µ0  0.065  -0.131  -0.527 
  (0.241)  (0.286)  (0.493) 
        µ1  0.953***  0.960***  0.960*** 
  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.025) 
        µ2  2.900***  2.922***  2.922*** 
  (0.040)  (0.041)  (0.041) 
       
Number of observations  5486  5486  5486 
Pseudo R 2  0.069  0.075  0.075 
Log Likelihood  -5720.119  -5686.846  -5686.846 
Note:  ‘Robust’ standard errors are bootstrapped based on 1000 replications and are presented in parentheses. 



















Table 4: Fairness of pay perceptions for the UK (1996 – 2000) 
Gender and race sub-samples 
(Pooled ordered probit regression results) 
Dependent Variable  Male  Female  White  Non-White? 
FEMALE       0.254***  0.427** 
      (0.042)  (0.196) 
          NON-WHITE  -0.148  -0.266**     
  (0.099)  (0.107)     
          AGE  -0.058 ***  -0.019  -0.024  -0.055 
  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.016)  (0.108) 
          AGE SQUARED/100  0.053**  0.017  0.020  0.044 
  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.018)  (0.128) 
          EARNINGS  1.082***  0.694***  0.829***  1.570*** 
  (0.076)  (0.069)  (0.052)  (0.326) 
          COMPARISON WAGE  0.253  0.471  0.150  1.477 
  (0.349)  (0.377)  (0.259)  (1.753) 
          1997  0.024  0.020  0.038  0.181 
  (0.090)  (0.099)  (0.067)  (0.404) 
          1998  0.103  -0.021  0.068  -0.233 
  (0.075)  (0.071)  (0.050)  (0.372) 
          1999  0.004  -0.032  0.020  -0.291 
  (0.076)  (0.078)  (0.053)  (0.371) 
          2000  -0.125  -0.121***  -0.072  -0.464 
  (0.087)  (0.083)  (0.060)  (0.404) 
          Regional dummies (1 – 11)  v  v  v  v 
Occupation dummies (1 – 7)  v  v  v  v 
Sector dummies (1 – 4)  v  v  v  v 
Industry dummies (1 – 15)  v  v  v  v 
          µ0  -0.064  -1.472*  -0.344  -3.359 
  (0.653)  (0.856)  (0.500)  (3.624) 
          µ1  1.016 ***  0.932***  0.954***  1.152*** 
  (0.038)  (0.034)  (0.026)  (0.166) 
          µ2  3.095***  2.829***  2.899***  4.004*** 
  (0.062)  (0.055)  (0.042)  (0.496) 
         
Number of observations  2643  2843  5197  289 
Pseudo R 2  0.108  0.059  0.072  0.188 
Log Likelihood  -2613.369  -3026.104  -5407.678  -252.324 
          Note:   ‘Robust’ standard errors are bootstrapped based on 1000 replications and are presented in parentheses. 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
? For the non-white sub-sample, there is no observation for the Northern statistical region, the private 
household employment industry and the electricity, gas and water industry. So there are only 11 















Table 5: Fairness of pay perceptions for the UK (1996 – 2000) 
(Pooled ordered probit regression results with full set of controls) 
Dependent Variable       
FEMALE   0.259***  1997  0.041 
  (0.047)    (0.067) 
          NON-WHITE  -0.167**  1998  0.077 
  (0.073)    (0.052) 
          AGE   -0.041**  1999  0.037 
  (0.017)    (0.058) 
          AGE SQUARED/100  0.016  2000  -0.044 
  (0.023)    (0.069) 
          MARRIED  0.062  µ1  -0.406 
  (0.039)    (0.686) 
          CHILDREN  0.030  µ2  0.984*** 
  (0.042)    (0.026) 
          EARNINGS  0.840***  µ3  2.988*** 
  (0.053)    (0.042) 
          COMPARISON WAGE   -0.140  Regional dummies (1 - 11)  v 
  (0.340)  Occupation dummies (1 – 7)  v 
          SCHOOL  -0.018  Sector dummies (1 – 4)  v 
  (0.050)  Industry dummies (1 - 15)  v 
          POST-SCHOOL   0.004     
  (0.059)     
          NON-MANAGERIAL  0.090  Prob > ?2:    
  (0.078)  EARNINGS=-COMPARISON WAGE  0.041 
          UNION MEMBER  -0.194*     
  (0.112)     
          UNION RECOGNITION  -0.014     
  (0.063)     
          FULL-TIME  -0.114*     
  (0.062)  Number of observations  5486 
          FIRM SIZE  0.047***     
  (0.017)  Prob > ?2  0.000 
          RELATION  0.271***  Pseudo R2  0.091 
  (0.023)  Log Likelihood  -5586.229 
          TENURE   0.006**     
  (0.003)     
          TENURE SQUARED/100  -0.000     
  (0.001)     
Note:  ‘Robust’ standard errors are bootstrapped based on 1000 replications and are presented in parentheses. 
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